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EDITORIAL
TO ABOLISH PARTISANSHIP OF EXPERT WITNESSES, AS
ILLUSTRATED IN THE LOEB-LEOPOLD CASE
In the course of a colloquy between counsel, over the testimony of
a psychiatrist called for the defense, this passage occurred: Mr. D.
"Let me ask you, doctor, what was Dick's attitude toward that compact?" Mr. C. "By 'Dick,' do you mean the defendant, Richard
Loeb ?"

Mr. D. "If necessary, I am willing to stipulate that 'Dickie' or
'Dick' means Richard Loeb, and that 'Babe' means Nathan Leopold, Jr."
This passage was evoked by the frequent instances of the expert
witnesses' use of the endearing, youthful, innocent epithets 'Dickie'
and 'Babe,' both in direct and cross-examination: thus:
Q. "Is Loeb the leader in this crime ?"
A. "I should say that Babe has the more constructive component, etc. Dickie on the other hand is rather essentially destructive,
etc."
1. This voluntary adoption of the endearing, attenuating epithets
'Dickie' and 'Babe' to designate the defendants reflects seriously on the
medical profession. The whole evil of expert partisanship is exemplified in this action of these eminent gentlemen.
Most of the criticism directed against distorted and manufactured
expert testimony has hitherto been based on the supposed bias due
to the fees-the money taint. But in this case the fee was exactly
the same on both sides. And in this case, also, the personality of the
gentlemen refutes the possibility of such an influence. Two of the six
experts testifying for the defense are known to me personally, and all
the world knows that in the case of all six no questi6n could possibly
arise of the taint of money. Their standing, their whole career, has
placed them beyond any such suggestion. And yet the sad spectacle is presented of these eminent scientists committing themselves
to the cause of one side rather than the other, by adopting epithets
calculated subtly to emphasize the childlike ingenuousness and infantile
naivity of the cruel, unscrupulous wretches in the dock. It was the
cue of the defense to impress this character oA the judge, and the
experts' well-chosen language lent itself shrewdly to that partisan end.
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2. What then is the ultimate cause of expert witnesses' partisanship, if it'is found even where character and reputation exclude the
cause comm6nly attributed?
It is this; the vicious method of the Law, which permits and
requires each of the opposing parties to suwnnn the witnesses on the
party's own account.
This, vicious method naturally makes the witness himself a partisan. He is spoken of habitually as "my" witness or "our" witness.
In the Loeb-Leopold case, where the experts devoted long hours to the
study of the defense's case, consulted only with the defense's counsel,
made preliminary reports to those counsel, cut down those original
reports in their testimony, and answered only the questions that were
asked by counsel, it was natural-and inevitable that their testimony
should take on a partisan color. Partly this would be unconscious.
Partly it would be conscious, in that they came to sympathize with the
only side of the case known to them, and in that they committed them'selves to conclusions which it was hard to modify when grilled by
hostile counsel.
This method of the law is inherently bad. Its badness -has long
been known or suspected. The Loeb-Leopold case merely gave a clear
demonstration of it to the eyes of all the world.
What is the remedy? Very simple. Let the expert witness be
summoned by the Court himself.' Let all subsequent proceedings be
based on this theory,-payment by the state,-consultations with
counsel on either side if desired,-direct interrogation by the Court,
and cross-examination by both counsel if desired,--exchange of views
beforehand with other experts, if any.
This is the only method that will remove the scandal and mistrust
that now attaches so often to expert testimony, whether in the medical
or other sciences.
3. The medical profession has long complained of the present
method. Yet the two methods commonly proposed as substitutes are
quite impracticable.
One of these is to compose the jury of experts. This is out of the
question; first, because the constitutional principle of jury trial will
not permit it; secondly, because no case turns solely on a scientific
issu6, and two juries, one of laymen and the other of experts, would
be unmanageable.
The other proposal has been to compile a standing list of official
experts, and to limit such testimony to this list. This proposal is impracticable; first, because local partisan politics would make such a

34J

MORALE

list untrustworthy; secondly, because the variety of scientific questions
is too great to have a list for each; thirdly, because no one judicial
area contains all the best experts on all subjects; and fourthly, because
it is and ought to remain a constitutional right of a party to secure
any testimonywhich he deems useful, regardless of an official list.
4. No,-there is only one remedy, but it is sufficient, viz., to
issue the summons from the Court on behalf of the Court, and to
place the zcitness on the stand as the Court's witness. This leaves each
party free to secure any witness he deems useful, by notifying the
Court of the person's name and address; the Court. issues and serves
the summons and notifies both parties that the witness will be called;
and the witness informs both parties whether and when he will consult with either or-both of them before trial. This ensures impartiality, both subjective and objective.
In the Loeb-Leopold case, one of the experts called for the state
refused originally to come as a partisan; he told the state's attorney
that he did not want to be a partisan witness, that he wished to be
free to form and to state any conclus'ons that he might reach. The
state;s attorney told him that he would be put on the stand whatever
conclusion he might reach. On that condition he consented to study
the defendants' personality; and the state's attorney never saw him
again until the morning of the hearing.
It is a pity that the eminent gentlemen who consented to be engaged for the defendants by the defendants' counsel did not refuse
to come unless and until they were summoned by the Court and for
the Court, with freedom to lay before the state's attorney before trial
every scrap of their conclusions. That would have been a fine service
to the cause of Science and Justice, and they would have been applauded as pathfinders by both professions.
JOHN H. WIGMORE.
.P

CONTROL BY MORALE
[The letter we publish below is pertinent, we believe, to the subject matter of the symposium that appears elsewhere in this number.
We venture to say that the morale or spirit of a community is the
strongest control over the behavior of individuals. If this is true every
heinous act must be clearly recognized in its character. Such recognition is a means of developing arid maintaining a morale that opposes
crime. This control is endangered every time we excuse or tolerate a
heinous crime (or any irregularity of conduct for that matter), and
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when we pile Ossa upon Pelion in re "mitigating circumstances," we
become blind to the forest by reason of our prating of trees.
We have before us a problem in social psychology. It is to solidify the population as one man-in this case-against the criminal. Our
leaders must go promptly, even to desperate lengths, in dealing .with
those who commit heinous acts. This is essential that the attention
of the people may be riveted upon the act of disapproval of the criminal behavior that we all hate. When this is done we will find a
tendency to develop the morale we want: one that will be just as
effective for control of behavior in peace time as our war-time morale
was for control of the behavior of soldiers at home and at the "front.
The war taught us many things, and among them this: if -we
want to get anything done, desirable or undesirable, leave no stone
unturned to develop an appropriate spirit or morale. We could not
have got contributions to the Red Cross and we could not have manufactured our heaps of shells without it. We are flouting this clear
lesson in the psychology of social life when we permit partisan psychiatrists, as in the Loeb-Leopold case, to split doubtful hairs re the
personality of self-confessed criminals and so divide the attention of
the public.
The community has been "honeycombed with the wrong sentiment." We have too much short-sighted attachment to the individual
narrowly considered, and we have not been wise enough to place him
in his proper place of subordination to the spirit that makes an effective
group.
ROBERT H. GAULT.

Editor, Journal, Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
Dear Sir: One of the most interesting questions in the Criminal
Law today is the "Crime Wave" and its cure.
Many different suggestions have been made and still the solution
does not appear to have been found. During an observation over a
number of years in connection with criminal trials in a large city, the
writer has -felt that the real trouble is that the old adage "familiarity
breeds contempt" applies.
"Crime," in our general conception, is a detestable, cowardly and
most reprehensible thing. It carries with it general condemnation. He
who would commit crime is outlawed, we are taught in childhood and
deserves just punishment. By crime in these instances we mean something mean and despicable. The reaction, therefore, is to shun the
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criminal and condemn the action. This is natural when we think of
the taking of human life viciously, as in murder, or arson, or the
stealing of another's property, or in any way intentionally injuring
another. Few of us but look with aversion at a murderer, or thief; and
all of us feel that the acts of murder or thievery are contemptible. A
convicted criminal naturally arouses a feeling of loathing and a convict
has our deep distrust.
These are our natural feelings. They exist in the child as in the
adult. Paint the picture as you will, and when the true character is
shown all people abhor him who is untrustworthy.
Now, let us see what crime is, that it produces such feelings in the
ignorant as in the well-informed. The Penal Law of the State of
New York describes Crime as "an omission forbidden by law and
punishable upon conviction by
Death, or
Imprisonment, or
Fine, or
Disqualification to hold office in the state, or
Penal Discipline.
Crime is a
Felony or a
Misdemeanor.
A Felony is punishable by
Death, or
Imprisonment in a state prison.
A Misdemeanor is any other crime."
punishable upon conviction by death, or imprisonment, or fine, or disqualification to hold office in the state, or penal discipline. Crime
is a felony or a misdemeanor. A felony is punishable by death, or
imprisonment in a state prison. A misdemeanor is any other crime.
The description is clear and plain. Further on the law provides
for the punishment of crime, and also describes some of the acts that
are crimes. If the matter ended there, perhaps the criticism contemplated would not apply, for the penal law describes most of the
serious unsocial acts.
It may be true that lack of adequate punishment, too much undeserved sympathy and maudlin sentiment has interfered with'the administration of the criminal law, but it has appeared to the writer that one
of the most important items in connection with the present apparent

MORALE

breaking down of civil government, insofar as 'the control of unlawful
acts is, that the whole structure has been honeycombed with the wrong
sentiment.
The point in mind is that it no longer is very reprehensible to be
a convicted criminal, for there is no adequate description of him.
The Penal Law provides that crimes are divided into felonies and
misdemeanors. It clearly describes felonies and then says, "all else
are disdemeanors." Certain civil disabilities follow one convicted of a
crime. Now what do our laws describ&- as some of the crimes?
Every violation of police regulations is a crime, as for instance,
parking one's car on the wrong side of a street, etc., violations of
health, or sanitary ordinances; failing to record a marriage within a
certain time, etc., and thousands of other simple acts, many times
innocent in themselves but, because prohibited, then criminal. Does
not "familiarity breed contempt"? If real serious offensive acts were
charged as crimes, felonies and misdemeanors and properly dealt with,
if acts seriously affecting the rights of others, or involving moral
turpitude were treated as crimes, and if violations of prohibitions were
only treated as such, is it not likely the criminal law would receive
greater respect and the community be better protected?
If a person forgets to carry his license to drive his automobile,
it is a crime, although he never has affected the rights of anyone, it
still is a misdemeanor or a crime and he, if he is punished after being
ha'ed to court, is forever after a convicted criminal.
Now the point I desire to make is: Would it not be a real benefit
to denominate those who have injured others as criminals and to make
a legal distinction between them and those who have done only some
prohibited act; innocent in itself., but still. prohibited. The idea is not
new, but it is relevant at this time when the criminal law seems to
be tottering.
ROBERT J. WILKIN,
Justice of the Children's Court, New York City.

